OASIS Mailing List ArchivesView the OASIS mailing list archive below
or browse/search using MarkMail.


Help: OASIS Mailing Lists Help | MarkMail Help

virtio-dev message

[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]

Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] [PATCH v5 1/2] content: add virtio file system device

On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 10:53:37AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> +\subsubsection{Security Considerations}\label{sec:Device Types / File System Device / Security Considerations}

One issue not addressed here at all is sharing the filesystem cache.
Is that a security consiteration at all?
A shared resource is often an information sidechannel.

> +
> +The device provides access to a file system containing files owned by one or
> +more POSIX user ids and group ids.  The device has no secure way of
> +differentiating between users originating requests via the driver.  Therefore
> +the device accepts the POSIX user ids and group ids provided by the driver and
> +security is enforced by the driver rather than the device.  It is nevertheless
> +possible for devices to implement POSIX user id and group id mapping or
> +whitelisting to control the ownership and access available to the driver.
> +
> +File systems containing special files including device nodes and setuid
> +executable files pose a security concern.  These properties are defined by the
> +file type and mode, which are set by the driver when creating new files or by
> +changes at a later time.  These special files present a security risk when the
> +file system is shared with another system, such as the host or another guest.

is this a risk to someone using the device, another system
with which this one is sharing, or both?

> +This issue can be solved on some operating systems using mount options that
> +ignore special files.

For this to be effective should not device provide a way for device
to report that the issue exists?

>  It is also possible for devices to implement
> +restrictions on special files by refusing their creation.

And then it can safely be mounted without above flags?
How would a device do this? The list above is not exhaustive.

> +
> +When the device provides shared access to a file system, symlink race
> +conditions, exhausting file system capacity, and overwriting or deleting files
> +used by others are factors to consider.  These issues have a long history in
> +multi-user operating systems and also apply to virtio-fs.  They are typically
> +managed at the file system administration level by providing shared access only
> +to mutually trusted users.

Can we be a bit more explicit here? I think this discusses
a device accessing a shared filesystem with some other
device. I am guessing it's the administrator of the filesystem, right?


[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]