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Subject: Re: [wss] New Issue: Key Identifiers Should Not Be Used for Signatures
r/hlockhar@bea.com/2003.06.17/10:06:12 >The problem is that the Relying Party has know way of knowing how many >certificates the sender has. At a minumum I would say this makes the spec >totally useless for non-repudiation purposes and even doubtful for ordinary >Authorization. I think that this certificate substitution attack is no different from the attack of submitting the initial request with certificate B (same key) instead. The recipient trusts certain CAs, presumably based upon their security policies. If one of the CA/PKI systems asserts that an identity/key binding is valid, the requestor proves ownership of the key, and the identity is sufficient for the recipient to authorize the request, then the request will be processed. It is up to the recipient not to accept certs issued by CAs that don't have adequate security policies. Merlin ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The information contained in this message is confidential and is intended for the addressee(s) only. If you have received this message in error or there are any problems please notify the originator immediately. The unauthorised use, disclosure, copying or alteration of this message is strictly forbidden. Baltimore Technologies plc will not be liable for direct, special, indirect or consequential damages arising from alteration of the contents of this message by a third party or as a result of any virus being passed on. This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept for Content Security threats, including computer viruses. http://www.baltimore.com
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