On 9 August 2017 at 13:19, Mark Davidson <Mark.Davidson@nc4.com> wrote:
As one method for achieving this, SOAP Headers (yes, the early 2000’s rear their ugly head) has a general “must understand” concept.
This was, as I recall, a borrowing of the OSI stack's critical extension concept (still used in X.509 certificates, for example).
It's a good model for static data, but I think in this case it is not sufficient, because there's little incentive to a data consumer to get perfectly useful data but then reject it because they don't understand the marking. It seems more likely they'll process it anyway.
In X.509, to contrast, the critical extension might include information about when *not* to trust the certificate (and indeed usually does), so it's in the consumer's interest to honour the bit.
As a producer, I’d like confidence that the markings I place will be respected, and I would like that confidence to be placed something other than convention.
Absolutely agreed. But the usual practise with marking schemes is that you assign people and peers with a clearance, which states what you trust those people to do with the marked data.
This would potentially allow finer-grained access, since one might choose to trust a peer to honour (say) "encrypt in transit", but not TLP Red (as a poor example).
But even just a simple binary switch on *sending* IEP-marked data seems more sensible than relying on the receiver to filter out thing they shouldn't have received in the first place.
Dave.
-- Dave Cridland
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