Re: [cti-taxii] HTTPS implementation language

["Jason Keirstead" <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>]

I worry a lot about having such strict
requirements for TAXII.  

I have said a few times on here in the
past ( Dec 16 / 2015, June 3 2016 ) that we want to be very careful here
of what we mandate vs. what we prescribe. 

I do not even think stating that a client
MUST implement TLS 1.2 is a good idea because it opens the door to us having
to emergency-revise the spec if and when there is a flaw discovered in
TLS 1.2

I especially do not agree with the mandate
that a TAXII server MUST support CRLs and PKIX client certificates to be
claim TAXII compliance. What if I only want to support JWT for authentication?

-
Jason Keirstead
STSM, Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems
www.ibm.com/security| www.securityintelligence.com

Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - Unknown




From:      
 Eric Burger <Eric.Burger@georgetown.edu>
To:      
 cti-taxii@lists.oasis-open.org
Date:      
 12/23/2016 12:37 PM
Subject:    
   [cti-taxii]
HTTPS implementation language
Sent by:    
   <cti-taxii@lists.oasis-open.org>

---

DRAFT

2.  HTTPS Requirements

The TAXII Protocol defined in this specification requires HTTPS as the
transport for all communications.

·      TAXII Servers and Clients MUST implement HTTPS [RFC7230].

·      TAXII Servers and Clients MUST implement TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246].

                
o   TAXII Servers and Clients SHOULD implement later versions when
available.

·      TAXII Servers MUST implement PKIX X.509 certificates
and certificate revocation lists [RFC5280 and RFC6818].

·      TAXII Servers MUST support authenticating certificates
using PKIX [RFC6125].

                
o   TAXII guarantees TAXII Clients can use at least PKIX (see above).

·      TAXII Servers and Clients MAY support other certification
verification policies such as:

                
o   Certificate Pinning: A single or limited set of either hard-coded
or physically distributed pinned certificate authorities or end-entity
certificates.

                
o   DANE: DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities [RFC7671]

                
o   Note that Self-Signed Certificates (like other certificates which
cannot be verified by PKIX) MAY be supported via Certificate Pinning and/or
DANE as noted above for limited, closed user group applications.
[attachment "signature.asc" deleted by Jason Keirstead/CanEast/IBM]