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Subject: Random key tokens and voting security
I've realized another lynch-pin here is random key assignment and access. In the polling station - random physical tokens are handed to voters to enable a voting session on a DRM - after their electoral roll entry is verified. For remote voters - a similar process may work. Eg a call-center where callers verify their credentials (they have pre-registered and received an entitlement letter in the mail with an activation code). Then the call-center can issue another code. Such codes would have to be one-time-use to prevent their sharing. In an open source environment there would need to be a configuration value that seeds the code generator, but that would remain secret along with the algorithm. That would prevent people generating their own codes. The ballot counting software could then check for valid codes by comparing to the list of those issued by the call-centers. As with the polling station - there would be no indexing of codes to voters. Of course this is not quite as guaranteed to be anonymous, as the call-center staff could record codes without the caller knowing. That's a trade-off between remote voting and privacy and security compared to the polling station. It's always the boundary conditions in systems that are the most problematic - and somewhere there has to be some level of trust. Another idea I like here is that call-centers can be regional - so that minimizes chances for vote selling. You could tie callers to their own phoneID numbers too for more physical verification much as the credit card companies do already. DW
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