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Subject: Re: [ws-rx] Updated proposal for i121
Gil, This document is definitely a step in the right direction. A few comments are attached below: (1) The connection between encryption and message integrity is misleading. TLS includes a message integrity check using HMAC (keyed MAC) on a per-message basis. Use of encryption supports a confidentiality requirement not message integrity; all references to encryption should be removed from the draft (unless confidentiality is an additional requirement) . I can propose alternative language in a change version of your draft. (2) I am troubled by prescriptive advice given on lines 184-186 that describes a specific technique for identifying a security token. As we have discussed before, the requirement to connect a specific security token to a specific message is a general requirement extending beyond RX. It would be much better if this text were to make reference to Section 8 of WS-SC which describes this technique versus inventing it from scratch, (3) Lines 189-192 state: [quote] For the lifetime of the Sequence the RM Source and the RM Destination use the session key(s) associated with the security context to either sign or encrypt (as defined by WS-Security) at least the body and any relevant WS-RM-defined headers of any and all messages or faults that refer to that Sequence. [\quote] The reference to encryption should be removed. Is it also possible to explicitly list the headers that must be signed? (4) Finally, Section 3 of WS-SC describes different models for establishing a shared SC. Should this specification offer advice on the models supported by a RM source and destination? Are all three models supported? --------------- prateek
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